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THE HAND OF GOD:  LIMITING THE IMPACT OF THE FORCE 
MAJEURE CLAUSE IN AN OIL AND GAS LEASE 
JOSHUA A. SWANSON 
ABSTRACT 
 
Lease disputes remain a hot topic in North Dakota oil and gas 
litigation.  An increasing topic of litigation in disputes between oil 
companies and mineral owners is whether the “force majeure” clause 
applies to save an oil and gas lease from expiring.  Commonly referred to as 
the “act of God” clause, oil and gas companies are beginning to use the 
force majeure clause as a catch-all savings provision in an attempt to hold 
leases where they have been unable to engage in timely drilling operations.  
There is limited case law in North Dakota to guide litigants as to whether 
the force majeure clause operates to hold their lease.  Recent cases out of 
New York, including the much publicized Aukema v. Chesapeake 
Appalachia, dealing with that state’s moratorium on hydraulic fracturing, 
indicate the force majeure clause in oil and gas leases may not be as broad 
as oil companies envision them.  This Article focuses on the growing 
importance of the force majeure clause in oil and gas leases and discusses 
what mineral owners can do to protect themselves against the unintended 
consequences of allowing the force majeure clause to turn every event into 
an “Act of God” that extends their lease indefinitely without production or 
drilling operations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We are told in the Book of Job, “The Lord gave, and the Lord hath 
taken away.”1  Putting aside its ecclesiastical meaning, what the Lord hath 
given to some by way of mineral rights can also be taken away, to the 
extent it is devalued by certain language in an oil and gas lease.  Almost 
without exception, every oil and gas lease contains a force majeure clause.  
The force majeure clause is commonly referred to as the “Act of God” 
clause with certain events specifically defined by the terms of the lease 
acting as an affirmative defense excusing performance under the lease.2  
What triggers the force majeure clause depends on the language in the 
lease, as the parties are free to define what qualifies as a force majeure 
event.3  This clause has become increasingly important as oil and gas 
companies maneuver to protect their interests in leases from expiring in 
light of the decision in Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia.4  In Aukema, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York held that 
a directive from the New York Governor, which resulted in a moratorium 
on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing pending completion of 
certain environmental impact assessments, did not qualify as a force 
majeure event excusing the lessees from performing under the terms of the 
subject leases.5 
Considering the potential impact of Aukema, mineral owners should 
anticipate that oil and gas companies will seek to expand the terms and 
scope of the force majeure clause in their leases by giving a broader 
definition to those force majeure qualifying events, saving a lease from 
expiring despite a lack of production and drilling operations.  Mineral 
owners can protect themselves by being diligent in reviewing language in a 
 
1. The full verse at Job 1:20-21 (King James) reads, “Naked came I out of my mother’s 
womb, and naked shall I return thither:  the Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be 
the name of the Lord.” 
2. Recall that an oil and gas lease is a contract, and “[t]he same general rules that govern 
interpretation of contractual agreements apply to oil and gas leases.”  Egeland v. Cont’l Res., 2000 
ND 169, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d 861, 864 (quoting Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 778, 
780 (N.D. 1984)). 
3. See, e.g., Maralex Res., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 76 P.3d 626 (2003).  In Maralex Resources, the 
parties each argued they were the rightful lessee to the disputed minerals.  The lessee to the 
original lease argued “[t]he lease did not terminate because the problem with line pressure was 
beyond their control and therefore triggered the force majeure clause, which applies when 
production ceases due to events beyond the control of the well operators.  See Sun Operating Ltd. 
P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Tex. App. 1998).”  Maralex Res., 76 P.3d at 636.  As is the 
case in North Dakota, the Court explained, “New Mexico has no cases interpreting a force 
majeure clause.  What types of events constitute force majeure depends on the specific language 
included in the clause.”  Id.  The Court held the original lease terminated as the problem with the 
line pressure did not constitute a force majeure event excusing performance.  Id. at 319. 
4. 904 F. Supp. 2d 199 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). 
5. See Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 209-11. 
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proposed lease and by pushing for a very specific and narrowly-defined 
force majeure clause limiting what is considered a force majeure qualifying 
event.  The failure of mineral owners to give the force majeure clause its 
proper due could result in mineral rights being tied up indefinitely without 
production and without any additional consideration being paid by the oil 
company to continue to hold the subject lease. 
 
II. A FORCE MAJEURE EVENT IS WHATEVER THE LEASE SAYS 
IT IS 
There is no set of stone tablets containing a list of events that do, or do 
not, automatically qualify as force majeure events.  The common law 
doctrine of force majeure has, in most instances, fallen by the wayside in 
favor of the specific terms bargained for by the parties to the lease.  
Traditionally, as noted by Corbin, force majeure was “a phrase coined 
primarily for the convenience of contracting parties wishing to describe the 
facts that create a contractual impossibility due to an ‘Act of God.’”6  
Today the idea of performance excused by an event beyond the contracting 
parties’ control, although not defined as a force majeure event under the 
terms of the lease, falls more appropriately under the umbrella of the 
common law defense of impossibility.7  Although the concepts behind force 
majeure and the defense of impossibility are similar, they are two separate 
affirmative defenses that should not be confused.8  Courts will look to the 
 
6. Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.2d 1244, 1248 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing 6 ARTHUR 
L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1324 (1962)). 
7. Like Corbin, supra note 6, in Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized the traditional concept of force majeure as 
meaning “[a]n event which is beyond the control of the contractor.”  729 F.2d 1530, 1540 (5th Cir. 
1984) (citing Squillante and Congalton, Force Majeure, 90 COMM. L.J. 4, 5 (1979)).  However, 
the Fifth Circuit recognized this traditional concept of force majeure was more appropriately 
included under the common law defense of impossibility as force majeure is a contractually-
defined event:  “The common law defense of impossibility due to Act of God [sic] requires the 
defendant to prove that an excusing event is beyond his control, and contractual force majeure 
provisions typically incorporate this requirement.”  Id. at 1540 (citing Eastern Airlines v. 
McDonnell Douglas, 532 F.2d 957, 991 (5th Cir. 1976)); cf. Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 756 
P.2d 1209, 1223 (Okla. 1988) (stating “[i]t should be recognized that the contract in question 
modified the common law definition of force majeure and that contractual terms negotiated 
between consenting parties may alter the common law definition.”).  Id. 
8. In Tallackson Potato Co. v. MTK Potato Co., the North Dakota Supreme Court explained 
that to establish the defense of impossibility, the party claiming the defense “[m]ust demonstrate 
that, among other things, its performance is strictly impossible or impracticable because of 
extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss, and that the [party’s] failure rendered 
its performance not only subjectively but also objectively impossible or impracticable.”  278 
N.W.2d 417, 424 (N.D. 1979).  In other words, the party “must show that it cannot perform and 
that performance could not be completed by anyone.”  Id.  Further, the party claiming the defense 
must show “[p]erformance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event 
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language of the contract itself to determine whether a particular event 
qualifies to excuse performance under force majeure.9 
There are two common boilerplate force majeure clauses found in 
North Dakota oil and gas leases.  Both are addressed in Aukema.  The first 
is a more limited force majeure clause, excusing the failure to perform only 
when such performance is prevented by government rule, order, law, or 
regulation:  “[t]his lease and its expressed or implied covenants shall not be 
subject to termination, forfeiture of rights, or damages due to failure to 
comply with obligations if compliance is prevented by federal, state, or 
local law, regulation or decree.”10  The second is a more expansive force 
majeure clause, excusing the failure to perform when such performance is 
prevented by everything from wars, to riots, lightning, explosions, and the 
failure to obtain materials, among others: 
In the event lessee is rendered unable in whole or in part, by a 
force majeure to carry out its obligations under this lease, other 
than to make payments of amounts due hereunder, its obligations 
so far as they are affected by such force majeure shall be 
suspended during the continuance of an inability so cause.  The 
term ‘force majeure’ as used herein shall be Acts of God, strikes, 
lockouts, or other industrial disturbances, acts of the public enemy, 
wars, blockades, riots, epidemics, lightning, earthquakes, 
explosions, accidents or repairs to machinery or pipes, delays of 
carriers, inability to obtain materials or rights of way on reasonable 
terms, acts of public authorities, or any other causes, whether or 
not of the same kind as enumerated herein, not within the control 
of the lessee and which by the exercise of due diligence lessee is 
unable to overcome.11 
 
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made . . . .”  Red 
River Wings, Inc. v. Hoot, Inc., 2008 ND 117, ¶ 56, 751 N.W.2d 206, 226. 
9. See infra notes 13-21. 
10. Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 204.  Similar language in many North Dakota leases 
provides: 
All express or implied covenants of this lease shall be subject to all Federal and State 
Laws, Executive Orders, Rules or Regulations, and this lease shall not be terminated, 
in whole or in part, nor Lessee held liable in damages, for failure to comply therewith, 
if compliance is prevented by, or if such failure is the result of, any such Law, Order, 
Rule or Regulation. 
See, e.g., Standard Producers Lease Form 88. 
11.  Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 206.  Note that force majeure does not excuse performance 
when the force majeure event relied on was caused by the lessee or could have been prevented by 
the lessee.  “A force majeure clause cannot be invoked to excuse performance where the delaying 
condition was caused by the lessee and could have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, 
diligence, and care.”  Erickson v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., 474 N.W.2d 150, 156 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1991) (citing Edington v. Creek Oil Co., 690 P.2d 970, 974 (Mont. 1984)). 
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As previously noted, and explained more in-depth herein, New York’s 
directive that led to a moratorium on horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing did not qualify as a force majeure event under the language of 
either of these boilerplate clauses.  This is not to say these clauses are 
acceptable for a North Dakota mineral owner.  While no North Dakota 
court has yet had cause to address whether a government moratorium on 
horizontal drilling or hydraulic fracturing would qualify as a force majeure 
event, it is highly debatable whether a North Dakota court would reach the 
same result as the Northern District of New York in Aukema.12 
There is a third force majeure clause also found, but less common, in 
North Dakota oil and gas leases.  This clause contains a key requirement 
that a mineral owner should insist upon: 
This lease shall not be terminated nor Lessee held liable in 
damages if compliance with covenants in this lease is prevented or 
hindered by an act of God, of the public enemy, adverse field, 
weather or market conditions, labor disputes, inability to obtain 
materials in the open market or transportation thereof, inability to 
obtain governmental permits or approvals necessary to Lessee’s 
operations, such circumstances of events being hereafter referred 
to as “force majeure.”  Lessee shall notify Lessor in writing within 
fifteen (15) days of the first occurrence of any claimed events 
defined herein which prevents or hinders any compliance, such 
notice required in order for said event to qualify as force 
majeure.13 
The key language in this third example is the requirement for the lessee (oil 
company) to provide the lessor (mineral owner) written notice within a set 
number of days in order to seek the protections of the force majeure clause.  
 
12. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hess Corp., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (D.N.D. 2010).  In Anderson, 
the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota addressed what activities 
qualified as “drilling operations” under the terms of an oil and gas lease in order to extend the 
lease beyond its primary term.  The Court found, as a matter of law, that activities falling short of 
actual drilling qualified as drilling operations: 
Hess Corporation surveyed and staked a well, obtained a permit to drill from the Oil 
and Gas Division of the North Dakota Industrial Commission, leveled and lazered the 
pad, dug the drilling pit and lined it with gravel and clay, widened the access road to 
the well, drilled the rat hole for the main conductor pipe, moved equipment to the 
location, and drilled the mouse hole . . .  [t]he Court finds, as a matter of law, that Hess 
Corporation engaged in drilling operations, thus extending the leases beyond the 
primary term. 
Id. at 1108, aff’d, 649 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2011).  This case is often cited by oil companies and 
mineral owners in arguing whether an oil company’s activities qualified as drilling operations that 
extended a lease beyond its primary term. 
13. This is similar to the force majeure clause contained in the lease in Perlman.  Perlman v. 
Pioneer Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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Mineral owners should incorporate this written notice requirement into the 
force majeure clause in their lease. 
According to most courts that have addressed the issue, a force majeure 
qualifying event is whatever the lease says it is.14  For example, in Sun 
Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Holt,15 the Court noted that the scope and 
application of the force majeure clause was literally dependent on the terms 
in the contract.16  The Court will not rewrite a lease to include events within 
a force majeure clause when, even though such events were indisputably 
beyond the control of the parties, they were not defined as force majeure 
events by the lease.17  Not even a national tragedy of the largest scale, such 
as the September 11th terrorist attacks, will qualify as a force majeure event 
unless it is specifically contemplated by the parties.18  The takeaway is 
clear:  the language in the lease will control whether an event does, or does 
not, fall within the scope of the force majeure clause.  Those relying solely 
on an expansive common law definition of the force majeure clause based 
on impossibility or foreseeability are likely to be disappointed by the court. 
 
14. See, e.g., 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed. 2013) and case annotations 
therein. 
15. 984 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App. 1998). 
16. The Court explained, “[t]he historical underpinnings have fallen by the wayside.  Force 
majeure, is now little more than a descriptive phrase without much inherent substance.  Indeed, its 
scope and application, for the most part, is utterly dependent upon the terms of the contract in 
which it appears.”  Id. at 283.  See also Perlman, 918 F.2d at 1248 n.5 (citing PPG Industries v. 
Shell Oil Co., 919 F.2d 17, 18 (5th Cir. 1990) (instructing parties to look to the language in the 
lease to determine whether performance is excused by the force majeure clause)).  “Instead, they 
should look to the language that the parties specifically bargained for in the contract to determine 
the parties’ intent concerning whether the event complained of excuses performance.” 
17. The Court will not substitute its judgment to rewrite the parties’ force majeure clause.  In 
Allegiance Hillview, L.P. v. Range Texas Prod., LLC, the Court expressed the dominant view 
that, “when the parties have themselves defined the contours of force majeure in their agreement, 
those contours dictate the application, effect, and scope of force majeure,” and reviewing courts 
“are not at liberty to rewrite the contract or interpret it in a manner which the parties never 
intended.”  347 S.W.3d 855, 865 (Tex. App. 2011). 
18. In OWBR, LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., the United States District Court for 
the District of Hawaii held, in part, that the September 11th attacks did not, by itself, excuse 
performance as inadvisable under the force majeure clause in the parties’ agreement.  266 F. Supp. 
2d 1214 (D. Haw. 2003).  The Court recognized the economic hardship and complications the 
attacks had on the defendant, Clear Channel, who booked a large Hawaiian resort for a music 
industry conference originally scheduled within a few months of the attacks.  Notwithstanding the 
economic hardship, the Court held the language in the force majeure clause did not excuse 
performance for economic hardship, even though the hardship resulted from the attacks:  “From 
an economic standpoint, it was certainly unwise, or economically inadvisable, for Defendants to 
continue with the Power Jam 2002 event.  Nonetheless, a force majeure clause does not excuse 
performance for economic inadvisability, even when the economic conditions are the product of a 
force majeure event.”  See Butler v. Nepple, 354 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1960); see also Stand Energy 
Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).  “The Force Majeure 
clause does not contain language that excuses performance on the basis of poor economic 
conditions, lower than expected attendance, or withdrawal of commitments from sponsors and 
participants.”  OWBR LLC, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1223-24. 
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Similar to other contracts, the contours of the force majeure clause in 
an oil and gas lease are shaped specifically and solely by the language in the 
lease.  In Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. Partnership,19 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained courts should look to the specific 
language of the force majeure clause and give effect to the intentions of the 
parties as expressed by that language when interpreting the scope of the 
force majeure clause.20  The Fifth Circuit held the district court erred when 
it impermissibly added a foreseeability and control requirement to the force 
majeure clause in the parties’ lease.21  The fact that force majeure clauses 
are interpreted narrowly further assists mineral owners.22  The decision in 
Aukema demonstrates just how narrowly a reviewing court will interpret the 
force majeure clause. 
III. AUKEMA:  A GAME-CHANGER FOR THE FORCE MAJEURE 
CLAUSE 
The decision in Aukema is likely to have an impact on the way oil 
companies structure the force majeure clause in new leases.  At first blush, 
it appeared the operators were on solid footing as New York’s directive 
resulted in, for all practical purposes, a moratorium on horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale within New York.23  The 
 
19. Perlman, 918 F.2d at 1248 n.5. 
20. Id. at 1248.  While explaining that the case was one of contract interpretation, the Fifth 
Circuit stated the following: 
The language in the force majeure clause in the Lease is unambiguous and its terms 
were specifically bargained for by both parties. Therefore, the ‘doctrine’ of force 
majeure should not supersede the specific terms bargained for in the contract.
  
When 
the terms of a contract are unambiguous, the courts must give effect to the intentions 
of the parties expressed by the language they employ. 
Id. 
21. Id.  “Because the clause labeled ‘force majeure’ in the Lease does not mandate that the 
force majeure event be unforeseeable or beyond the control of [the party invoking the clause] 
before performance is excused, the district court erred when it supplied those terms as a rule of 
law.”  Id.  The Fifth Circuit ultimately held the force majeure clause did not apply, rejecting 
Perlman’s attempt to invoke the clause, finding that the government regulators did not hinder his 
performance so as to trigger the clause.  See id. at 1248-49. 
22. See, e.g., In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“[Force majeure clauses] are construed narrowly and will generally only excuse a party's 
nonperformance if the event that caused the party's nonperformance is specifically identified.”). 
23. The Marcellus Shale is one of several shale formations, including North Dakota’s 
Bakken formation, which has been unlocked by the staggering successful combination of 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.  Wall Street is bullish on the domestic energy boom 
brought about by horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing that, some worry, could go bust if 
regulations, like New York’s directive, restrict these practices.  In the December 16, 2013, issue of 
Forbes, writer Daniel Fisher praises the future of domestic energy production resulting from the 
shale boom, but mentions this future is not one without risks.  “The shale boom isn’t without risk, 
of course.  One is political:  Environmentalists in states not used to the sight of drilling rigs are 
mounting a fierce political battle to ban fracking (old hands wince at the insertion of a ‘k’ in a 
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issue in Aukema, and its far-reaching effects, was appropriately summerized 
by the Defendants, Chesapeake Appalachia (“Chesapeake”) and Statoil 
USA Onshore Properties (“Statoil”), in their Memorandum of Law 
opposing the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and in support of 
their own cross-motion for summary judgment.24  According to Chesapeake 
and Statoil, this moratorium brought development in the Marcellus to a 
“screeching halt” and threatened millions of dollars already invested in 
developing the formation:25 
The question here is whether oil and gas leases between Plaintiffs 
and Defendants (the “O&G Leases”) were extended in the face of 
the unprecedented statewide ban on the combined use of horizontal 
drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing (“HVHF”) that has 
been in existence in New York for four years, i.e., since July 23, 
2008, when then-Governor Paterson ordered supplemental 
environmental review of HVHF under the New York State 
Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) (hereinafter, the 
“Moratorium”).  The Moratorium bans the combined use of 
horizontal drilling and HVHF pending completion of the 
supplement to the 1992 generic environmental impact statement 
(“1992 GEIS”), and this ban has effectively brought natural gas 
development in New York to a screeching halt.  Hanging in the 
balance are hundreds of millions of dollars that have already been 
invested by operators toward deep shale development.  And, 
against this backdrop, as leases have reached the end of their 
 
term based on the word ‘fracturing’), even though the technology has been widely used in U.S. 
oilfields since it was developed in Kansas in the late 1940s.”  Daniel Fisher, How to Play the 
Shale Boom’s Next Phase, FORBES, Dec. 16, 2013, available at 
http://www forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/11/27/how-to-play-the-next-phase-of-the-shale-
boom/. 
24. Plaintiffs were fifty-five mineral owners that entered into oil and gas leases held by 
Chesapeake and Statoil.  The Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
declaration that the subject leases expired at the end of their primary terms and were not extended 
by the force majeure clause.  See Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
25. The Court recognized the sheer magnitude of the Marcellus and how horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing opened it up: 
According to the DEC, the Marcellus Shale is a shale formation extending deep 
underground from Ohio and West Virginia northeast into Pennsylvania and southern 
New York.  It is as deep as 7,000 feet or more below ground in some areas.  See 
N.Y.S. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Marcellus Shale (2012), available at 
http://www.dec ny.gov/energy/46288 html.  Geologists estimate that it may contain up 
to 489 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.  Id.  Although the gas potential in the 
Marcellus Shale is not a new discovery, drilling companies abstained from exploration 
and extraction because of the difficulty and expense associated with drilling such a 
deep formation.  However, recent advancements in technology and the use of HVHF 
prompted drilling companies to reconsider opportunities in the Marcellus Shale. 
Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 203. 
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primary terms, operators have invoked their contractual and 
common law rights, claiming lease extension under these dramatic, 
compelling circumstances.26 
Chesapeake and Statoil argued New York’s directive was a force 
majeure event that extended the disputed leases because it constituted a 
state regulation that, in effect, banned the only viable way to develop the 
Marcellus in the counties where the leases were located.27  While vertical 
drilling was available, and Chesapeake unsuccessfully drilled vertical wells 
in an attempt to develop the acres subject to the leases, Chesapeake and 
Statoil argued the only economically viable and commercially practicable 
manner to develop the leases was horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing.28 
The Plaintiffs countered that common law force majeure did not apply 
to extend the leases beyond their primary terms, because it is a narrow 
doctrine only excusing performance when the subject matter of the contract 
is destroyed or the means of performance are rendered impossible.29  
 
26. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Aukema v. Chesapeake 
Appalachia, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 199 (N.D.NY. 2012) (No. 11CV00489) [hereinafter 
Memorandum]. 
27. See Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
28. Id. at 209-10. 
29. Id. at 209.  Plaintiffs and the Court appear to be erroneously labeling the defense of 
impossibility as “common law force majeure.”  In Memorandum, supra note 26, Plaintiffs argue 
that, “[w]here a parties’ [sic] written agreement fails to contain a force majeure clause, there is no 
basis for a force majeure defense and the doctrine of common law force majeure is inapplicable.”  
Id. at 17.  In making this argument, Plaintiffs cite several cases, primarily relying on Gen. Electric 
Co. v. Metals Res. Group Ltd., 741 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) and Kel Kim Corp. v. 
Cent. Markets, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1987).  Both General Electric and Kel Kim discuss the 
defense of impossibility and properly reference it as such.  For example, in Kel Kim, the Court of 
Appeals of New York explained the common law defense of impossibility: 
Impossibility excuses a party’s performance only when the destruction of the subject 
matter of the contract or the means of performance makes performance objectively 
impossible.  Moreover, the impossibility must be produced by an unanticipated event 
that could not have been foreseen or guarded against in the contract.  Applying these 
principles, we conclude that plaintiff’s predicament is not within the embrace of the 
doctrine of impossibility. 
Kel Kim, 519 N.E.2d at 296.  The Court then compared the doctrine of impossibility to the force 
majeure clause in the disputed contract: 
For much the same underlying reason, contractual force majeure clauses—or clauses 
excusing nonperformance due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties—
under the common law provide a similarly narrow defense.  Ordinarily, only if the 
force majeure clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents a party’s 
performance will that party be excused.  
Id.  See also Gen. Electric Co., 741 N.Y.S.2d at 418: 
In any event, it is not a basis for reliance upon the impossibility of performance 
doctrine.  The force majeure doctrine is no more helpful to defendant.  The parties’ 
integrated agreement contained no force majeure provision, much less one specifying 
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Plaintiffs argued performance was not impossible because permits were still 
available for traditional drilling methods, like vertical drilling, and the 
State’s directive was a foreseeable event.30  According to Plaintiffs, under 
common law force majeure, performance is excused only if the qualifying 
event is unforeseeable.31  Finally, Plaintiffs argued the force majeure 
clauses in the leases were not triggered because the claimed force 
majeure—the issuance of permits for horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing—was not specifically defined as a force majeure event under the 
leases.32 
The Court agreed with Plaintiffs, holding the force majeure clauses in 
the various leases, nor “common law force majeure,” extended the leases 
beyond the expiration of their primary terms.33  Alternatively, the Court 
noted that even if New York’s directive was a force majeure qualifying 
event, it did not save the leases from expiring because the directive did not 
preclude Chesapeake or Statoil from performing under the terms of the 
leases.34  The Court began its analysis by describing the general purpose of 
the force majeure clause, which is to excuse performance under the contract 
when performance is prevented by a force beyond the parties’ control or the 
purpose of the contract is frustrated.35  As the parties invoking the force 
majeure defense, Chesapeake and Statoil had the burden to establish a force 
majeure qualifying event occurred that saved the leases from expiring at the 
end of their primary terms.36  The Court found, in detriment to Chesapeake 
and Statoil’s position, that “[m]ere impracticability or unanticipated 
 
the occurrence that defendant would now have treated as a force majeure, and, 
accordingly, there is no basis for a force majeure defense (internal citations omitted). 
Cf., supra notes 6-88 and accompanying text.  The Court in Aukema ultimately distinguished 
between the doctrine of impossibility and the force majeure clause grounded in the contract. 
30. Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 210-11.  The leases had different variations of the force majeure clause.  See id. at 
203-07.  The Court held none of the force majeure clauses applied to save the leases from 
expiring.  Id. at 210-11. 
34. Id. at 210. 
35. “The primary purpose of force majeure is to ‘relieve a party from its contractual duties 
when its performance has been prevented by a force beyond its control or when the purpose of the 
contract has been frustrated.” Id. at 210 (quoting Phillips Puerto Rico Core, Inc. v. Tradax 
Petroleum, Ltd., 782 F.2d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 1985)).  The Court again seems to intermingle the 
concept behind the common law defense of impossibility with the contractually-based force 
majeure defense.  While the concept and roots connecting the two may be similar, it is important 
to note, as explained herein, that a force majeure qualifying event must be specified by the 
contract.  See supra notes 14-21.  This “general purpose,” or the historical underpinnings of force 
majeure, as recognized in Sun Operating Ltd. and Perlman, “[h]ave fallen by the wayside.”  See 
supra note 15 and accompanying text.  The Court in Aukema does recognize in the same 
paragraph that the force majeure qualifying event must be specifically referenced in the lease. 
36. Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 
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difficulty is not enough to excuse performance,” and the “[f]orce majeure 
clause must include the specific event that is claimed to have prevented 
performance.”37 
In ruling that the force majeure clauses did not save the leases from 
expiring, the Court explained that New York’s directive did not prevent 
Chesapeake and Statoil from performing under the terms of the leases.  
Despite the directive and resulting moratorium, Chesapeake and Statoil 
could still explore, drill, produce, and otherwise conduct operations to 
extract oil and gas.  The only thing they were unable to do—the one thing 
Chesapeake and Statoil argued they needed to do to develop the leases—
was horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. 
The purpose of the leases is to explore, drill, produce, and 
otherwise operate for oil and gas and their constituents.  
Defendants may still explore, drill, produce, and otherwise operate 
for oil and gas and their constituents.  The Directive put a halt on 
horizontal drilling using HVHF; drilling permits for conventional 
drilling methods have, and continue to be, issued in the area of 
plaintiffs’ lands.  The only thing defendants were unable to do 
during the primary terms was to horizontally drill using HVHF.  
The leases do not limit defendants’ right to drill to a specific type 
of drilling nor a particular formation.  While defendants submit 
evidence demonstrating that horizontal drilling combined with 
HVHF is the only commercially viable method of production in 
the Marcellus Shale and drilling using conventional methods is 
impractical, ‘[m]ere impracticality . . . is not enough to excuse 
performance.’  Defendants did not contract for guaranteed 
production of oil and gas; they contracted for access, exploration, 
and the right to drill for a set period of time.38 
As the Court recognized, the language in the force majeure clauses at issue 
did not specifically limit Chesapeake and Statoil’s right to drill to a specific 
type of drilling, i.e., horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic 
fracturing.  The Court went as far to acknowledge that horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing were the only commercially viable method of 
production in the Marcellus and drilling using other conventional methods 
was not practical.  However, as noted herein, mere impracticality or 
 
37. Id. (quoting Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Empresa De Polimeros De Sines Sarl, 720 F. Supp. 
312, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)) (citing Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Markets Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 
(N.Y. 1987)). 
38. Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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economic hardship is not enough to trigger the force majeure clause and 
excuse performance.39 
Furthermore, Chesapeake and Statoil contracted with the knowledge of 
all government regulations, laws, rules, and orders that could have an 
impact on their leases.  In addition to arguing that force majeure saved the 
leases from expiring, Chesapeake and Statoil argued the leases should be 
extended based on the doctrine of frustration of purpose.40  In lease disputes 
involving alleged force majeure events, it is common for oil companies to 
also raise the affirmative defenses of impossibility and frustration of 
purpose.  The doctrine of frustration of purpose is similar to the defense of 
impossibility.41  These defenses excuse performance under the contract 
when unforeseeable events beyond the parties’ control interfere with the 
principal purpose of the contract (frustration of purpose) or performance 
under the terms of the contract becomes objectively impossible 
(impossibility).42  Chesapeake and Statoil argued their leases should have 
been extended because New York’s directive and resulting moratorium on 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing frustrated the primary purpose 
of the leases.43 
The Court disagreed, finding that New York’s directive was 
foreseeable.  To prevail under the frustration of purpose defense, the event 
frustrating the purpose of the lease must be a “virtually cataclysmic, wholly 
unforeseeable event” that renders the lease valueless.44  Specifically, 
 
39. Cf. OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’n, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1223 (D. Haw 
2003). 
40. “In addition to relying on force majeure, defendants argue the leases should be extended 
based on the doctrine of frustration of purpose.  They contend the Directive and resulting 
moratorium wholly frustrate the primary purpose of the leases.”  Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 211. 
41. In Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, the North Dakota Supreme Court described these defenses 
as related.  2011 ND 140, ¶ 13, 800 N.W.2d 320, 329.  “[F]rustration of purpose is a defense to a 
breach of contract claim and constitutes an avoidance of all or part of a plaintiff's contract claim. 
WFND, LLC v. Fargo Marc, LLC, 2007 ND 67, ¶ 18, 730 N.W.2d 841, 851.  “[F]rustration of 
purpose occurs when after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated 
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made.”  Id. (quoting Tallackson Potato Co., Inc. v. MTK 
Potato Co., 278 N.W.2d 417, 424 n.6 (N.D. 1979)).  In Tallackson, the court also discussed a 
related doctrine of impossibility of performance and said that to establish impossibility, a 
defendant must establish its performance is strictly impossible or impracticable because of 
extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss, and that [a third-party's actions] 
rendered [the defendant's] performance not only subjectively but also objectively impossible or 
impracticable.  278 N.W.2d at 424 n.6.  In other words, [the defendant] must show that it cannot 
perform and that performance could not be completed by anyone.” Silbernagel, ¶ 13, 800 N.W.2d 
at 329 (quotations omitted). 
42. See id. 
43. See Philbro Energy, Inc. v. Empresa De Polimeros De Sines Sarl, 720 F. Supp. 312, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
44. Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (quoting United States v. Gen. Douglas MacArthur 
Senior Vill., Inc., 508 F.2d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
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because the environmental reviews and regulations existed at the time the 
leases were executed, the Court found “[i]t was foreseeable that a non-
conventional drilling method such as HVHF would require additional 
environmental review.”45  As explained in Erickson v. Dart Oil and Gas 
Corporation, Chesapeake and Statoil were presumed to have contracted 
with knowledge of New York’s laws and regulations, including the 
environmental review process that could have, and ultimately did, cause 
delay in developing their leases.46  The case law indicates that not only are 
oil companies presumed to have contracted with knowledge of already 
existing laws, rules, and regulations, they are also presumed to have 
contracted with knowledge of any laws, rules, and regulations that are 
foreseeable.  This includes regulations similar to New York’s directive that 
resulted in the moratorium on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. 
Considering the numerous court decisions on the application of the 
force majeure defense, and the affirmative defenses of impossibility and 
frustration of purpose, the result in Aukema is not all that surprising.  To 
invoke the force majeure clause, courts are in near unanimous consent that 
the qualifying event must be specifically provided for in the lease.  
Likewise, as the above-referenced cases demonstrate, the defenses of 
impossibility and frustration of purpose provide a high bar for the oil 
company to successfully raise them as affirmative defenses—namely, that 
the qualifying event for either impossibility or frustration of purpose must 
be a “virtually cataclysmic” and “wholly unforeseeable” event.47  
Moreover, the oil company, rather than the mineral owners, is in the best 
position to prepare for and address these events in the lease. 
The Court recognized as much in Aukema. As the party drafting the 
leases, Chesapeake and Statoil were in the best position to include drilling 
specifications as to the methods used, i.e., horizontal drilling or hydraulic 
fracturing, or formations explored, as specific force majeure qualifying 
events.48  Rightfully so, the Court did not let Chesapeake and Statoil hide 
behind the defenses of impossibility or frustration of purpose when there 
was a lease governing the relationship between them and the mineral owner.  
 
45. Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 211. 
46. “Where governmental action is alleged to be the cause of delay, the parties to the lease 
are presumed to have contracted with knowledge of any preexisting law that could have caused 
delay.”  Erickson v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., 474 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (citing 
Hughes v. Cantwell, 540 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. App. 1976)).  See also Goldstein v. Lindner, 648 
N.W.2d 892, 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (“Parties to a lease are assumed to know what laws and 
regulations will affect the company’s ability to win permits.  For that reason a lessee’s failure to 
secure a permit is not deemed an event of force majeure.”). 
47. See supra notes 7, 8, 38-43, and accompanying text. 
48. “As the drafters of the leases, defendants were in the best position to impose drilling 
specifications as to the methods used or formations explored.”  Aukema, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 
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Under North Dakota law, it is a bedrock principle of contract interpretation 
that the court construes a lease against the party who drafted it – most often 
the oil company – who, presumably, looked out for their best interest while 
drafting the lease.49 Chesapeake and Statoil did not include any drilling 
specifications related to methods used or formations explored as force 
majeure qualifying events.  This was their fault, not the mineral owners.   
For example, had Chesapeake and Statoil included language specifying 
that any restriction, regulation, limitation or directive of any kind imposing 
additional requirements, environmental or otherwise, on horizontal drilling 
or hydraulic fracturing, like New York’s directive, constitutes a force 
majeure event preventing the lease from terminating, the Court likely would 
have found such a force majeure clause saved their leases from expiring.  
Chesapeake and Statoil were not allowed to hold the Plaintiffs’ leases in 
perpetuity because they failed to account for known contingencies in their 
leases.  Because the responsibility is on the drafter of the lease, the oil 
companies should take particular notice of this dicta in Aukema and draft 
their leases with more broadly tailored force majeure clauses encompassing 
directives and restrictions affecting drilling methods.50 
IV. THE TAKEAWAY FOR NORTH DAKOTA MINERAL OWNERS 
While the result in Aukema favores the mineral owners, North Dakota 
mineral owners should not rest in their diligence while reviewing leases.  
Mineral owners should assume that oil companies will adjust to account for 
decisions like Aukema when drafting new leases.  As noted by Sabino and 
Abatemarco, Aukema will strongly influence the drafting of leases for years 
to come, particularly with regard to the scope of the force majeure clause.51  
Mineral owners should expect that oil companies will seek a broader force 
 
49. “[It] is a cardinal principle of contract interpretation that the court should construe a 
contract most strongly against the party who prepared it, and who presumedly looked out for his 
best interest in the process.”  In re Gateway Investors, Ltd., 113 B.R. 564, 568 (Bkrtcy. D.N.D. 
1990) (citing Graber v. Engstrom, 384 N.W.2d 307, 309 (N.D. 1986); Ray Co. v. Johnson, 325 
N.W.2d 250, 252 (N.D. 1982); Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 
497 (N.D. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–07–19 (1943)). 
50. Industry has already taken notice.  In a recent article appearing in the Natural Gas and 
Electricity Journal, the authors concluded that Aukema will strongly influence the drafting of 
leases:  “In conclusion, Aukema may have been a loss to industry participants, but it was the right 
decision for the right reason.  The defendants here knew or should have done a better job of 
anticipating changing circumstances.  They should have drafted a more inclusive force majeure 
clause. As we said at the outset, we have little doubt that this ruling will strongly influence the 
drafting of exploration leases for years to come.”  Anthony M. Sabino and Michael J. Abatemarco, 
Federal Court:  Fracking Disputes Are Not A Force Majeure, NATURAL GAS & ELECTRICITY J., 
Feb. 14, 2013, http://www naturalgaselectricitynews.com/article-print-page/federal-court-
fracking-disputes-are-not-a-force-majeure.aspx. 
51. See supra notes 7, 8, 38-43, and accompanying text. 
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majeure clause in their lease that incorporates all sorts of contingencies that 
qualify as force majeure events.  The post-Aukema force majeure clause 
could include limitations or new environmental reviews on horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, the inability to timely obtain permits, even 
if caused by the oil company’s lack of diligence and perhaps economic 
hardships that render exploration or production unfavorable, as force 
majeure events.  Mineral owners should keep in mind that the court will 
look first and foremost to the language in their lease when determining 
whether it has terminated because of the force majeure clause. 
Mineral owners should oppose these and other broad force majeure 
terms in their lease.  If the oil company refuses to narrow the scope of such 
a far-reaching force majeure clause, the mineral owner is not without 
recourse.  The mineral owner can always refuse to sign the lease.52  If the 
mineral owner decides that leasing is the best option for them, they should 
insist on language—no matter the scope of the force majeure clause in their 
lease—that the oil company is required to provide them written notice 
within a set number of days of any alleged force majeure event in order to 
seek the protections of the force majeure clause.53  For example, the mineral 
owner should insist the oil company provide them with written notice 
within fifteen days of the first occurrence of the alleged force majeure event 
in order for the force majeure clause to apply.  A mineral owner should 
insist this written notice requirement be incorporated into the force majeure 
clause in their lease. 
As always, mineral owners should carefully review their lease, and 
whenever possible, consult with an attorney to ensure their rights are 
properly protected.  Prudence and patience are the touchstones, and taking 
the time to review and consult with an attorney before agreeing to a lease 
may save a mineral owner considerable frustration down the road.  At a 
minimum, by exercising these virtues and consulting with an attorney, the 
mineral owner can make informed decisions with a full understanding of 
the proposed lease rather than signing away their mineral rights based on 
fine print they do not fully understand.  The fine print matters.54  If you are 
fortunate and the Lord hath given you mineral rights, do not let the oil 
 
52. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (1957). 
53. See, e.g., Perlman, 918 F.2d at 1246. 
54. See generally Joshua A. Swanson, The Fine Print Matters:  Negotiating an Oil and Gas 
Lease in North Dakota, 87 N.D. L. REV. 703 (2011). 
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company take them away by devaluing them with an over-inclusive 
definition of what constitutes force majeure or an “Act of God.”55 
 
 
55. This article is dedicated to my parents David and Denise Swanson, grandparents Jim and 
Norma Swanson, and great-grandma Norma Swanson for making this article and my legal career 
possible. 
